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1 These issues are investigated in
Tabellini and Alesina (1990),
and Tabellini (1991).
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conomic models with multiple equilib-
ria, such as Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), have become increasingly use-
ful in analyzing volatility in ﬁnancial mar-
kets and in business cycles. In many of
these models, indeterminacy is a result of
incomplete ﬁnancial markets or technolog-
ical nonconvexities. Here we identify eco-
nomic policy discretion to be another
distinct cause of indeterminate equilibrium
and examine how discretion affects the
number of equilibria, as well as their
volatility.
By discretion, we mean institutions
that assign to successive policymakers the
freedom to change, without cost, the deci-
sions of their predecessors. Policy making
looks forward in environments of this
type: Today’s decisions depend on the ex-
pectations of how tomorrow’s policymak-
ers will react to situations they expect to
prevail the day after tomorrow, and so on
forever. Policy choice is indeterminate be-
cause there is no way to pin down the be-
havior of the policymaker at +¥. One pos-
sible class of equilibria under this
institutional framework will display large
swings in policy variables of the sort that
Milton Friedman (1948 and 1968) and
other monetarist writers identiﬁed as the
source of many business cycles.
As a counterpoint to discretion, we
also study an environment dominated by
constitutional rules, that is, institutions
that restrict the freedom to alter policies
inherited from the past. In particular, a
constitution that gives current policymak-
ers some veto power over changes in fu-
ture policies endows public choices with
an element of precommitment that makes
current policy a genuine state variable.
This setting makes future policies more
predictable when one knows past policies.
It also delivers two desirable properties
claimed for rules by Friedman (1948 and
1968) and by Kydland and Prescott
(1977): Fluctuations are completely elimi-
nated from the set of equilibria, and all
equilibrium allocations are social optima.
The speciﬁc policy question we study
is the evolution of social security transfers
among ﬁnite-lived households in an inﬁ-
nite economy, where individual prefer-
ences over ﬁscal transfers are single-
peaked, and policy conforms to the wishes
of a well-deﬁned median voter household.
Analyzing social security naturally sheds
light on a number of issues related to in-
tergenerational resource transfers, for ex-
ample, public debt, currency, and the gen-
erational distribution of the tax burden. As
we shall see later, the reasons why soci-
eties maintain a social security system
stem in part from a social compact and,
hence, apply with equal force to issues like
defaulting on public debt and preserving
the purchasing power of currency.
For the time being we focus on social
security in the overlapping generations
model of pure exchange without ﬁat
money. Selﬁsh individuals live two periods
and are endowed with (and consume) a
single good. This good is private, and
claims on it (consumption loans) are the
only assets in the economy. We assume
away altruistic preferences and the provi-
sion of public goods—two key elements in
the political economy of ﬁscal policy—
to bring out more clearly the impact of
political institutions on ﬁscal policy out-
comes.1
Political institutions in this article de-
ﬁne the authority of the government, that
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is, of the median voter, to tax away en-
dowment income. We study two institu-
tional environments that allow more and
less of this power. The more discretionary
of the two political systems we study is
pure majority voting that permits the
larger of the two population groups
(young and old) in our economy to reduce
the consumption of the minority group to
its minimum feasible level. The less discre-
tionary system is a constitution requiring
the majority to obtain the approval of the
minority to any changes in social security
taxes and beneﬁts.
Constitutional limits to ﬁscal transfers
serve as an endogenous mechanism of 
partial policy commitment, one that has
certain similarities with the standard as-
sumptions used in the literature to exclude
from the median voter’s strategy set all off-
equilibrium plays that depend on what
might have transpired two or more periods
earlier.2 The constitutional approach seems
to us to be preferable to artiﬁcial restric-
tions on voting strategies, for it corre-
sponds to political structures we observe
around us and does not altogether rule out
trigger strategies. We regard economic in-
stitutions like public debt service and so-
cial security to rest on social compacts
that connect many successive governments
and many generations of (possibly self-
interested) voters. We therefore wish to
consider trigger strategies that allow in
principle today’s ﬁscal policies to spill over
several periods into the future, not just 
tomorrow.
The next section describes a pure-
exchange economy whose equilibria we
analyze in the subsequent sections under
the majoritarian and constitutional sys-
tems. The concluding section discusses the
literature relating to social security games
and some extensions of our main results.
A BASELINE MODEL
We start with a simple economic envi-
ronment in which the government has a
socially useful role. The economy is an
overlapping generations model of pure ex-
change of the Samuelson type: It consists
of an inﬁnite number of two-period co-
horts. At any point only two generations 
are alive: young and old. Agents are identi-
cal within generations. The young are en-
dowed with e1 > 0 units of the only con-
sumption good; the old receive e2 ³ 0 units.
The consumption good cannot be stored
and the population growth rate is n > 0.
There is an initial old generation,
t = 0, which consumes only in old age.









t+1),  > 0,
where ct
t represents the consumption at
time t of the generation born at time t (the
young), and c
t
t+1 is the consumption at
time t + 1 of the same generation (the
old). The utility function is concave, twice
differentiable and separable over time. In
addition, we assume that the absolute
value of the Marginal Rate of Substitution
at the initial endowment point (e1, e2)
is below the gross growth rate of the 
economy, that is,
(1) (1 + n) > U¢(e1)/U¢(e2).
To motivate the institution of social secu-
rity in the simplest possible manner, we
rule out outside assets like ﬁat money or
public debt, which permit resources to be
transferred between generations. We also
rule out productive capital and similar
stores of value.
Without government intervention, au-
tarky is the only equilibrium in this in-
complete market economy. It corresponds
to point  in Figure 1. The life cycle util-
ity of a typical generation t = 1, 2, . . . at
autarky is,
(2) u ~ = U(e1) + U(e2).
As we know, a social planner may eas-
ily achieve a higher level of life cycle util-
ity for all generations t = 0, 1, . . . in a
Samuelson economy. One example is a sta-
tionary reallocation from autarky that
levies a lump sum tax  g on each young
2 The section on literature and 
extensions gives an overview.
Contributions most relevant to
this article are Hammond
(1975), Sjoblom (1985), 
Kotlikoff et al. (1988), Esteban
and Sakovics (1993), Boldrin
and Rustichini (1995), and 
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person and distributes the proceeds
equally among the older generation. The
resulting equilibrium is the golden rule,
corresponding to point G in Figure 1. This
reallocation has the following generational
payoff:
(3) g =
U(e1 - g) + U(e2 + (1 + n) g) t ³ 1
U(e2 + (1 + n) g) t = 0,
where g maximizes the right side of the
top line in equation 3.
SOCIAL SECURITY WITH
MAJORITY VOTING
Many policy decisions in democracies
require approval by a simple majority, that
is, by 50 percent plus one vote in a cham-
ber of deputies representing the electoral
body. In practice, the will of an electoral
majority may be limited by nonpropor-
tional representation, veto power from
other branches of government, or various
political power groups. Nevertheless, ma-
joritarian systems are both descriptive and
analytically tractable. For simple cases in
which voters’ preferences over policies
outcomes are single-peaked, the Median
Voter Theorem enables us to aggregate in-
dividual tastes and obtain as an equilib-
rium of the voting process the outcome
most preferred by a well-deﬁned agent—
the median voter.
We analyze majority voting over social
security in the spirit of Hammond (1975).
We postulate a pay-as-you-go transfer sys-
tem with no commitment technology: A
vote every period determines the social se-
curity tax,  t, levied on each young house-
hold, as well as the beneﬁt (1 + n) t paid
out to each old household. The current
median voter in this arrangement cannot
compel future voters to pay tax  s for any
s > t. To reﬂect electoral realities and pro-
vide some incentives toward intergenera-
tional cooperation, we assume that the
median voter belongs in the young genera-
tion. Table 1 provides some support for
this assumption.
The set Y of feasible ﬁscal policies
contains all tax/transfer schemes that en-
sure consumption by the young is nonneg-
ative, and consumption by the old is
bounded below by an exogenous subsis-
Figure 1
 
   
 
  
               
 
                       
                                   
             
Median Vo t e r ’s Age
Year Election for Electorate Reported Voters
1992 President 41 44
1990 Congress 40 47
1988 President 40 44
1986 Congress 40 47
1984 President 39 43
1982 Congress 40 47
1980 President 40 44
1978 Congress 41 47
1976 President 41 45
1974 Congress 41 47
1972 President 42 44
1970 Congress 45 48
1968 President —* 46
1966 Congress 45 47
1964 President 45 46
* Data not available.
Source: U.S. Census, “Voting and Registration in the Election of 19**”-Issues: 466, 453,
440, 414, 405, 383, 370, 344, 322, 293, 253, 228, 192, 174, and 143.
Table 1tence level that we assume to equal the
old-age endowment. Hence,
(4) t Î Y = [0, e1].
The median voter in generation tmaximizes
(5) U(e1 - t) + U(e2 + (1 + n) t+1),
subject to equation 4 and given the strategy
followed by the median voter of the suc-
ceeding cohortt+1. The electoral body 
consists of individuals aged between 21 and
76 years; a rough generational division will
classify the age range 21-48.5 as “young”
and the age range 48.5-76 as “old.”
Open-Loop Equilibrium
A convenient benchmark is open-loop
strategies that depend purely on calendar
time and not at all on history. These strate-
gies are independent of the actions of
preceding players—both in and out of
equilibrium—and hence provide no incen-
tives for cooperation among generations.
Hammond (1975) and Sjoblom (1985), in
fact, recognized that the open-loop out-
come is zero social security. Loewy (1988)
also found that the open-loop equilibrium
of a monetary economy shrinks to zero the
purchasing power of currency. Because
autarky is inefﬁcient in a Samuelson-type
economy, Pareto improvements are
achieved by reallocations toward the
golden rule. Open-loop equilibria are inef-
ﬁcient because they fail to transfer con-
sumption in the correct direction.
Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Selﬁsh median voters who behave in
the apparently cooperative fashion that
sustains a social security system must do
so because of enlightened self-interest, that
is, because each cohort is individually
better off with a social security system in
place than without one. Incentives to co-
ordinate ﬁscal policies over cohorts of me-
dian voters may be thought of as social
compacts or norms enforced by a system
of rewards and punishments.
Here is an example of how reinforce-
ment works: Cohorts who transfer to the
old the resources speciﬁed by the norm ex-
pect to receive in their own old age a nor-
mal payment; cohorts who defect from the
norm in their youth for no apparent reason
expect to receive a zero transfer in old age.
Finally, cohorts who deviate from the norm
with good reason, for example, to punish a
prior unprovoked defection, expect to be
treated normally later. Social norms in this
example are enforced by a sequence of trig-
ger strategies that connect the decisions of
median voters with the behavior of their
predecessors. Kandori (1992) and Salant
(1991) have already demonstrated how
these strategies make cooperation individ-
ually rational when it is infeasible to com-
mit to a future policy course.
Simple majoritarian systems turn out
to sustain any individually rational alloca-
tion as a subgame perfect equilibrium by
the use of an appropriate trigger strategy
proﬁle. This folk-like result, conjectured
in Hammond (1975), has the following
formal statement:
Proposition 1 (Majoritarian Folk




¥ of life cycle utilities
bounded below by the autarkic
equilibrium level  , there exists a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the majoritarian social security
game that starts at t and pays off
*
S ³ for all s ³ t.
The proof, which we outline here, con-








¥, together with off-equilibrium
play that punishes odd-numbered (ﬁrst,
third, etc.) successive defectors by driving
their old-age consumption to its subsis-
tence level e2. To complete the proof, one
shows that no median voter will be the ﬁrst
to defect from the equilibrium policy 
*
S,
and that the best response to defection is
immediate punishment by the next median
voter. Only unprovoked defectors are pun-
ished out of equilibrium; nobody defects in
equilibrium.
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fect equilibria under majority voting are
ones that make each cohort prefer inter-
generational cooperation over the open-
loop outcome. In particular, all transfer
policies satisfy the generational rationality
constraint
(6) U(e1- * S) + U(e2 + (1 + n) * S+1) ³ .
As we surmise directly from Figure 2, in-
equality 6 deﬁnes a map, f, which con-
nects today’s social security tax with the
lowest incentive compatible tax for tomor-
row and has two ﬁxed points. These are
the subsistence transfer of zero, and a
higher value,  max, above which individu-
ally rational transfers explode and youth-








¥ that satisﬁes inequality 6 is a sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the majority
voting system. Figures 2 and 3 display all
these sequences both directly and also in
terms of the old-age consumption that cor-
responds to each one. Speciﬁcally, the set
of equilibria contains:
• A continuum of constant sequences
t = Î[0,  max] "t;
• Dynamically inefﬁcient sequences
bounded above by the golden rule,
for example, sequences that sat-
isfy  t £ g - for some  > 0 and
"t ³ T;
• Volatile or cyclical sequences that
may be generated by any non-
monotone map, f, we care to draw
within the shaded area of Figure 3.
Note also in Figures 2 and 3 that sub-
game perfect equilibria exist which pay off
every cohort, except the initial old, more
than the golden-rule utility level. This bo-
nanza is made possible by the invention of
social security in some ﬁnite period, with
an initial beneﬁt below the golden-rule
value  g. The resulting surplus may then
be spread among all subsequent cohorts by
a rising sequence of beneﬁts that con-
verges to  g.
The large amount of indeterminacy
present in Figures 2 and 3 stems directly
from voters’ inability to commit their suc-
cessors on a particular course of ﬁscal pol-
icy. The next section explores how reﬁne-
ments in political institutions bring about
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   drastic changes in both the size and the
volatility of ﬁscal policies.
CONSTITUTIONAL RULES
Policy adjustments in a democratic so-
ciety often require wider approval than
that of a simple legislative majority. This
observation applies particularly when:
(1) there is uncertainty as to the identity
or preferences of future policymakers; and
when (2) the policy change under consid-
eration contains the seeds of its own re-
versal because it affects adversely the in-
terests of (and will likely draw loud objec-
tion from) a politically signiﬁcant group.
Table 2 shows that congressional superma-
jorities were typically mustered whenever
U.S. Social Security laws were changed.
In what follows, we ignore all future
uncertainty and focus on case 2 above.
Speciﬁcally, we consider a political
arrangement that partly precommits ﬁscal
policy by awarding the current median
voter veto power over future policy
changes. Veto power is exercised through a
constitution, assumed to be ﬁxed and im-
mutable for the time being. The constitu-
tion empowers the younger cohort at time
t to set up a binary ﬁscal policy agenda, Yt,
and entrusts the old to choose from the
agenda the actual policy  t to be imple-
mented this period.
Formally, we have
(7a) t Î Yt = { t-1, pt}
where t-1 is last period’s actual policy and
pt Î [0, e1] is the new social security tax
level proposed by the young. The status
quo ﬁscal policy  t-1 plays the role of a
state variable here and makes all the differ-
ence between the constitutional political
structure and the majoritarian one.
Constitutionalism in this setting en-
courages commitment. The old can guar-
antee themselves the same social security
as their immediate predecessors by vetoing
any pt ¹ t-1. The young, too, can ensure a
constant ﬁscal policy sequence by choos-
ing pt = t-1, that is, with an offer to main-
tain the status quo ante.
We assume the economy starts off in
autarky, without a social security system,
and the initial agenda in period one is
(7b) Y1 = {0, p1} p1 ³ 0.
Old generations have a simple decision:
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Social Security Laws: Congressional
Approval History *
Year Law’s Content Approval Rate (%)
1990 No Future Increase in Beneﬁts
No Future Reduction in Tax Rate H
†: 413-15 (96)
1983 Increase Retirement Age in 2000
No Reduction of Initial Beneﬁts
Future Raise in Payroll Taxes H: 230-200 (53)
Bill to Overhaul S.S. System H: 243-102 (70)
S
‡: 58-14 (81)
1981 No Beneﬁts Reduction for Current Recipients H: 450-13 (97)
Restore Minimum Beneﬁts H: 412-10 (98)
S: 96-0 (100)
1977 Increase Taxable Income H: 189-163 (54)
Increase Payroll Tax Rate S: 56-21 (73)
1973 Increase Beneﬁts by 11% H: 301-13 (96)
Increase Payroll Tax Rate S: 66-0 (100)
1972 Increase S.S./Medicare Beneﬁts H: 305-1 (100)
Increase Payroll Tax Rate S: 61-0 (100)
1971 Increase Beneﬁts by 10% H: 360-3 (96)
Final Approval of 1970 Bill S: 76-0 (100)
1970 Increase Beneﬁts by 10%
Increase Taxable Base H: 344-32 (91)
Change to Medicare/Medicaid S: 81-0 (100)
1967 Increase Beneﬁts by 13% H: 390-3 (99)
S: 62-14 (82)
1965 Introduction of Medicare H: 307-116 
Increase Beneﬁts S: 70-24 
1964 Increase Beneﬁts by 5% H: 388-8 (98)
Increase Taxable Base/Tax Rate S: 60-28 (68)





Source: Congressional Quarterly Inc., “Congressional Quarterly Almanac,” Volumes XX to L.
Table 2They pick the largest item on the agenda
because their utility is monotone in the
size of the transfer. The old would clearly
choose to exercise their power to veto any
reduction in social security; hence transfer
sequences will be nondecreasing.
Agenda setting by the younger cohort
guarantees them the golden-rule payoff
g.3 This is easiest to see when the social
security system is invented: Starting from
autarky at t = 1, any young cohort can get
a unanimous vote to raise the social secu-
rity transfer level from zero to the golden-
rule value (1 + n) g, and veto any ﬁscal
changes in the subsequent period t = 2.
Given the defection payoff, it is now
straightforward to prove the following
constitutional analogs of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 (Constitution Folk




¥ of life cycle utilities
whose lower bound is the golden-
rule level  g, there exists a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium of
the constitutional social security
game that starts at t with zero so-
cial security and pays off
*
S ³ g
for all s ³ t.
Subgame perfect constitutional trans-
fers must be feasible, that is,
(8a)
*
S Î[0,  g] "t,
and individually rational for old and








t)+ U(e2 +(1 +n)
*
t+1)³ g.
Inequality 8c again deﬁnes a map between
today’s actual tax and tomorrow’s mini-
mum incentive compatible tax. It has only
one ﬁxed point this time, just  g.
Because no stationary allocation can
pay more than the golden rule, one corol-
lary of the individual rationality constraint
(inequality 8c) is the following:
C o ro l l a ry: The golden rule is the
u n i q u e stationary subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Of course, it is possible for nonstationary
equilibria to pay off more than the golden
rule because an initial old generation re-
ceived less. However, the distance of any
n o n s t a t i o n a ry equilibrium from the golden
rule must asymptotically shrink to zero be-
cause it would take an explosive sequence of
transfers to keep welfare bounded away fro m
the golden-rule payoff. In fact, one easily
demonstrates the following re s u l t .
P roposition 3: All constitutional
equilibria support allocations that
c o n v e rge to the golden rule. 
The proof is straightforw a rd: The tax se-
quence (
*
S) is bounded and weakly incre a s i n g
by deﬁnition. It converges to the golden-ru l e
value  gbecause it would be individually irr a-
tional for 
*
t to remain bounded above by a
number less than  gand infeasible to re m a i n
bounded below by a number bigger than  g.
The irrationality is simple to show: If 
*
t<  g
then inequality 8c tells us that a proposal to
raise the social security tax to  gi m m e d i a t e l y,
and the veto subsequent changes would re-
ceive the unanimous approval of all curre n t l y
existing generations. The infeasibility of
maintaining 
*
tsome distance above  g f o re v e r
is again easy to see from inequality 8c that re-
q u i res transfer payments to increase faster
than the rate of growth nif 
*
t >  g.
To gain insight on this, look at Pro p o s i-
tions 2 and 3 jointly. You will thus conclude
that a constitutional grant of veto power to
the minority is sufﬁcient to eliminate all
volatility and all dynamic inefﬁciency fro m
majoritarian subgame perfect equilibria. Fig-
u re 3 shows how much the policy commit-
ment emanating from this power shrinks the
set of equilibrium allocations down to the




Social security plays a role similar to
public debt in reallocating consumption
3 If the old generation was to set
the agenda, the game would
have no equilibria in pure
strategies, as the young would
refuse to transfer resources to
the old, preferring instead to
start a social security system
when they become old.
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public debt and ﬁat money, social security
is a social contrivance whose value as a
transfer payment mechanism depends on
mutual trust among cohorts and on some
degree of intergenerational cooperation. In
plain language, social security is like a
bubble, and it would be useful to relate
the social security equilibria we studied in
the previous two sections with the dynam-
ics of public debt and ﬁat money Wallace
(1980), Tirole (1985), and others have
studied.4 The connection is easiest to es-
tablish in situations of zero primary bud-
get deﬁcits. Consider, for example, an ac-
tuarially fair tax sequence ( t) such that
(9a) - t + (1 + n) t+1/Rt+1 = 0,
where
(9b) Rt+1 = u¢(e1 - t) / [ u¢(e2 + (1 + n) t+1) ] .
This sequence adds zero present value
to each generation’s life cycle income
computed at interest rates that corre-
spond to marginal rates of substitution at
the consumption vector c
t = (e1 - t, e2 +
(1 + n) t+1) implied by the sequence ( t).
Each element of this sequence represents
excess supply by a typical member of gen-
eration t, as well as 1/(1 + n) times the ex-
cess demand by each member of genera-
tion t - 1. Equations 9a and 9b describe
the reﬂected offer curve of a generation-t
household.
These two equations, in fact, describe
dynamical equilibria in pure-exchange
economies with a given stock of ﬁat
money or public debt. All we need to
reinterpret actuarily fair social security as
public debt or currency is to think of  t as
the real per capita value of the govern-
ment liability and of equation 9a as the
government budget constraint in an econ-
omy with zero public consumption and
zero primary budget deﬁcit. Then it is
easy to see that the golden-rule outcome
is the only stationary actuarially fair equi-
librium, likely to prevail under a credible
constitutional arrangement that commits
to maintaining the purchasing power of
social contrivances—or bubbles—like cur-
rency, public debt, or social security.
By the same token, the indeterminacy
of equilibrium we encounter in economies
with bubbles is directly related to the ab-
sence of a credible promise from the Trea-
sury or the central bank to preserve the fu-
ture value of the bubble. Another source of
indeterminacy creeps in if, in addition, we
permit governments or median voters to
deviate from the fairness of the present-
value relationship (equation 9a) by run-
ning a primary budget deﬁcit of their
choice. Then majoritarian equilibria may
well suffer from the larger degree of inde-
terminacy exhibited by the subgame per-
fect allocations of Figures 2 or 3.
Shrinking the large set of subgame
perfect equilibria has been a priority in
the ﬁscal policy literature ever since
Hammond (1975). It is typically achieved
by ruling out trigger strategies. Kotlikoff
et al. (1988) and Esteban and Sakovics
(1993) restrict the strategy sets of the me-
dian voter to costly Markovian strategies
of the form t+1 = ( t). They assign a 
ﬁxed resource cost k > 0 to any change 
in the social security tax. The resource
cost works as a form of partial com-
mitment.
Other researchers choose more eclec-
tic equilibrium reﬁnements that specify
exactly how the various generations 
share the social surplus from social secu-
rity. Boldrin and Rustichini (1995), for
instance, assign the entire surplus to 
the generation that invents the system. 
Cooley and Soares (1995) study majori-
tarian stationary equilibria in a calibrated
pure-exchange economy with four-period
lived households. They focus on the tax
rate preferred by the second-youngest
generation. This generation closely corre-
sponds to the age proﬁle of the median
U.S. voter.
We conclude by discussing the ro-
bustness of the conclusions reached ear-
lier about the operating characteristics
and the social desirability of constitu-
tional rules for ﬁscal policy. It seems sen-
sible to us to examine the ﬂexibility of
ﬁscal constitutions when structural para-
4 See Azariadis (1993), chapters
19 and 24, for a modern treat-
ment of bubble dynamics.
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ulation growth, undergo temporary or per-
manent change. We do so to understand if
the constitutional award of veto power to
some minority voting block may result in
socially excessive transfer payments of the
type many analysts claim to observe in
some European countries. A third impor-
tant issue is whether the monotonicity
p ro p e rt y, or positive time-trend, of social
security taxes stated in Proposition 2 gener-
alizes when more than two economically
active generations exist at any one time.
Inﬂexibility is a serious problem with
constitutional ﬁscal structures. Imagine,
in particular, that voters set the tax at a
numerical level independent of any real-
izations of the income and other parame-
ters of the economy.5 An instructive ex-
ample of this phenomenon is to endow
the young with a binary stochastic in-
come stream,
st= with probability p
> w.p. 1-p.
We keep old-age endowment constant at 
e2 as before and assume that voting takes
place each period after endowment realiza-
tions. Hence the ﬁrst young generation
that experiences the high income realiza-
tion,  , will obtain constitutional approval
for raising the transfer level to the golden
rule of the economy with deterministic in-
come vector ( ,e2). In later periods, old
voters in this economy will resist any pro-
posal to lower the transfer to the level im-
plied by the golden rule of the economy
with the smaller deterministic income vec-
tor ( ,e2), even if  happens to be the in-
come of the actual tax-paying generation.
It is in this sense that constitutions or veto
power may lead to excessive social secu-
rity. Similar arguments can be made about
random changes in population parameters.
What about the robustness of Proposi-
tion 2? Are constitutionally set social secu-
rity transfers likely to be monotone if
changes in the system require an elevated
majority of voters rather than complete
unanimity? This situation may be explored
in a model with more than two coexisting
generations like Cooley and Soares (1995).
In particular, would a coalition of, say, one
quarter or more of all voters attempt to
block a proposal to reduce permanently
social security taxes or beneﬁts by  > 0?
The answer depends on the demographic
and income structure of the economy, as
well as on several other things, but it ap-
pears to us to be in the afﬁrmative. This
proposal will surely be opposed by retirees
and persons sufﬁciently near retirement
because it reduces the present value of
their remaining lifetime incomes. The cut-
off age depends on the prevailing rate of
interest, but assuming this to be about
53 years of age, opposition against a re-
duction in social security will unite 20 or
more cohorts in the 56- to 75-year-old
age group, with 30 cohorts in the 21- to
50-year-old age group (including the me-
dian voting cohort) being in favor of re-
form, and the 51- to 55-year-olds standing
on the margin.6 If this opposition group
has veto power, Proposition 2 will extend
to economies with richer demographies
than the one assumed here.
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